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Abstract: This paper examines the mix of technical, regulatory, and business strategy 
issues that arise in implementing next generation broadband platforms in Europe. Our 
review of some European studies on NGAN in Europe and our specific focus on the Italian 
situation, in particular on the competitive situation in Milano, shows the relevant flaw of 
continuing to advocate national patterns of regulation. In fact, the deployment of NGAN 
calls for a radical shift of regulation on a geographic level. The recognition that a NGAN 
business case does exist for OLO in a number of local areas, mainly metropolitan ones, 
has relevant regulatory implications.In the first place, since the conditions of competition 
differ significantly among local areas, regulation should promote both incumbents' and 
OLO's investments in NGAN by limiting ex ante interventions to those enduring economic 
bottlenecks found at a specific geographic markets level. In the second place, market 
definition is the most important step in the market analysis procedure to help decide 
whether to regulate a given service provided over a NGAN or not. We have proposed a 
taxonomy of local areas that may be adopted in a country like Italy for a correct 
geographic definition of markets 4 and 5 and, as a consequence, for the imposition of 
appropriate remedies. 
Key words: Next Generation Networks, geographic markets, geographic remedies, 
infrastructure sharing, market definition. 
 
any European incumbents and some alternative operators are 
starting to plan and in some cases deploy large scale fiber 
investments, resulting in significant changes for European fixed 
line markets. The technologies used and the pace of development vary from 
country to country according to existing networks and local factors. This 
paper examines the mix of technical, regulatory, and business strategy 
                     
(*) The views here expressed do not represent the positions of the organizations the authors 
belong to, but only the authors' personal standpoints. We thank, for their helpful comments, two 
anonymous referees, Claudio Boreggi and the participants of the sessions on NGN at the 18th  
ITS Regional Conference in Istanbul, 2-5 September 2007 and TPRC 29-30 September 2007 in 
Washington DC 
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issues that arise in implementing next generation broadband platforms in 
Europe. While the conclusions in terms of market structure are likely to differ 
from market to market, our analysis suggests that the traditional "One size 
regulation fits all" approach is not going to work in Europe.  
In fact, although we do not think that fiber will follow the US example - the 
forbearance model - throughout Europe, we strongly believe that regulation 
will have to be more flexible. If promoting facilities-based competition is the 
goal, it is necessary for regulation to adopt a case by case approach to 
regulate access in order to ensure a reasonable return on investment and 
guarantee fair competition (DASGUPTA & WAVERMAN, 2007). Given the 
different underlying cost conditions of entry and presence of alternative 
platforms, it may be more appropriate to geographically differentiate the 
access regulatory regime.  
The balance of this paper is organized in four sections. The 2nd Section, 
using some business case studies, discusses the economics of Next 
Generation Access Networks (NGAN) in more detail, these networks' need 
for a more flexible approach to deployment and why the idea that each 
player can choose a different technology and architecture to fit its needs is at 
the heart of NGAN development. Furthermore, this section presents ad hoc 
geographic cases to show why geography matters in defining the right 
regulatory framework to guarantee efficient investment and development of 
competition. The 3rd Section provides an overview of the current European 
regulatory practice on geographic markets, using the body of knowledge on 
geographic markets from the European New Regulatory Framework. At the 
same time, this section suggests how to shape regulatory policies for NGAN 
using the geographic dimension of the market definition in an NGAN 
framework. The last Section concludes.  
  The economics of NGAN 
In this section we present the economics of next generation access 
networks, focusing on the most used wired network solutions (Fiber to the 
Cabinet and Fiber to the Building/Home). Furthermore, we discuss the 
different solutions that these new networks suggest to incumbent and 
alternative operators to compete in the broadband market and examine the 
development of NGAN through ad hoc case studies, such as Milano in Italy.  
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NGAN architectures 
The introduction of Next Generation Networks (NGN) 1 sets the stage for 
a new era in the communication sector. NGN represent a profound 
revolution where the electronic communications market becomes heavily 
integrated with information society services with far reaching implications for 
network architectures, market development, and the need for new 
approaches to policy and regulation. 
However, for the purpose of this paper, the analysis of NGN will be 
limited to the current and future developments of network architectures in the 
local loop, i.e., Next Generation Access Network (NGAN). In the last few 
years, all major telecom operators have started trials or deployment of new 
access network architectures. This behaviour can be explained by the need 
to develop new services to generate new sources of revenue to recover from 
the losses from traditional voice services, to face network obsolescence and 
reduce operational expenses, to better compete with old and new players 
(such as Google), to handle the physical saturation of the copper broadband 
network and to exploit the availability of new network solutions at ITU-T 
standards such as VDSL2 and GPON.  
Although a NGAN can make use of fiber, copper utilizing xDSL 
technologies, coaxial cable, powerline communications, wireless solutions or 
a hybrid deployment of these technologies, we will focus on wireline access 
networks, which is where the current and planned efforts of incumbents and 
alternative operators is concentrated on, and regulators' attention is directed 
to. In fact, the timing and choices of specific technologies for NGAN may 
vary between countries, geographic areas and operators. This variation 
depends on a plurality of factors including state and age of existing physical 
network infrastructure, length of local loop, population density and structure 
of the housing market, distribution of number of users and number of street 
cabinets per Central Office, level of intermodal competition in the market, 
willingness to pay for broadband services and the existence of ad hoc 
national government plans for broadband development. Therefore, the idea 
of flexible solutions for NGAN, i.e. that each player can choose a different 
                     
1 A "Next Generation Network (NGN) is a packet-based network able to provide 
telecommunication services and able to make use of multiple broadband, QoS-enabled 
transport technologies and in which service-related functions are independent from underlying 
transport-related technologies. It enables unfettered access for users to networks and to 
competing service providers and/or services of their choice. It supports generalized mobility 
which will allow consistent and ubiquitous provision of services to users". (ITU-T Rec. Y. 2001). 
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technology and architecture to fit its needs, seems to be at the heart of 
NGAN development. In fact the limits of the single, uniform architecture 
approach have been well known in the literature since the late 90's 
(PUPILLO & CONTE, 1998). 
Figure 1 presents the wireline next generation access network 
architectures to bring broadband services to customer premises.   
Figure 1 – Next Generation Access Network architectures 
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Source: Telecom Italia, 2007 
Fiber to the Exchange (FTTE) 
This solution uses the current copper network in both the primary and the 
secondary distribution network. It is based on the ADSL2+ technology and 
an optic fiber from the Central Office to the transport network. It allows for 
broadband connections up to 20 Mbit/s downstream and up to 1 Mbit/s 
upstream. It is recommended for sparsely populated areas. 
Fiber to the Cabinet (FTTCab) 
This solution uses fiber from the central office to the street cabinet and 
copper from the cabinet to the customer premises. It consists of a new 
cabinet containing the Optical Network Unit (ONU) serving a few hundreds 
of lines and including the VDSL2 apparatus. It allows for a downloading 
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capacity of up to 50 Mbit/s and uploading one of up to 10 Mbit/s at a 
distance of up to 700 meters.  
Fiber to the Building (FTTB) 
This solution uses fiber from the central office to the building. It consists 
of a smaller Optical Network Unit (ONU) (serving dozens of lines) including 
the VDSL2 modem to connect the fiber to the copper network of the building. 
It allows for a downloading capacity of up to 100 Mbit/s and an uploading 
one of up to 40 Mbit/s at a distance of up to 200 meters.  
Fiber to the Home (FTTH) 
This solution uses fiber from the central office to the customer premises 
and completely bypasses the copper network. It does not require any new 
cabinet. It allows for a symmetric capacity of up to 1 Gbit/s.  
Cost drivers of NGAN 
We will focus our attention on the FTTCab and FTTB/H architectures as 
they appear to be the most relevant cases in several European countries. 
Many factors and parameters constitute cost drivers for these architectures. 
The following broad cost categories can be distinguished: 
• Infrastructures 
• Electronics  
• Customer Premises Equipment 
Infrastructures 
It includes the (horizontal) trenching and ducting and fiber cabling 
deployments and (vertical) costs of in-house wiring for the FTTH solution. It 
encompasses the cost of the splitters. For the FTTCab solution the fiber 
costs are relevant for connecting the street cabinet to the central Office. 
They are even more important for FTTB/H scenario as fiber is brought up to 
the building. Different studies assume these costs to be between 50% and 
80% of the total costs per customer depending on the population density 
(ARCEP, 2006; JPMorgan, 2006). The ducting costs depend to a large 
extent on the usage of existing infrastructure such as trenches or ducts. 
When existing narrowband, broadband, or other utilities infrastructures can 
be used, these costs can be dramatically reduced.  
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Electronics 
It includes the equipment costs such as ONU. For the FTTCab case, it 
also includes the cost of the cabinet. These are "fixed cost" per street 
cabinet and need to be recouped per line. The number of clients reachable 
per street cabinet plays a major role.  
Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) 
It includes the modem and all the electronics on the customer premises. 
In fact, for the FTTH solution the CPE cost includes the ONU itself that is 
placed on the customer premises.  
Figure 2 presents the relative estimates of capital expenditures for the 
deployment of the different fiber access architectures. 
Figure 2 – Capex estimates for different fiber access network deployment 
 
Source: Telecom Italia, 2007 
Comparing the per line capital expenditure of the current solution (FTTE) 
with the other architectures, the FTTCab architecture costs 7-8 times more 
than the FTTE, the FTTB 12-13 times and FTTH about 20 times more than 
the FTTE.  The relative different weight of the electronics and CPE as well 
as the major role played by the costs of infrastructure is clear. 
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Incumbent vs alternative operators' architecture choices 
Given the described cost structures, how are the incumbent and the 
alternative operators positioning themselves? The "Fiber Battle" report by 
JPMorgan (2006) emphasizes that incumbents and alternative operators in 
Europe have launched large scale fiber deployments. The majority of 
incumbents are choosing FTTCab; the alternative operators' choice is FTTH 
in densely populated areas, thus completely bypassing the incumbent 
network. Some operators, such as Telecom Italia, are choosing both FTTB 
and FTTCab solutions in different cities and even in different areas of the 
same city. 
There are three reasons for incumbents to roll out FTTCab:  
• Revenue Upside: Incumbents believe that the superior capability of 
VDSL2 will allow them to charge premium prices.  
• Cost savings from reduction in operating expenses and from the 
planned closure of many central offices when the VDSL2 network is 
completed. 
• Strategic evaluation: deploying VDSL2 is a rational way to face 
competition from cable companies and defend market share against triple 
play cable offering. 
The JPMorgan report clearly suggests that the VDSL2 solution changes 
today's LLU paradigm. In fact, VDSL2 will have a disruptive impact on the 
current business models of LLU operators. Where the incumbents' VDSL2 
plans imply the discontinuation of central offices, LLU operators  need to 
revert to bitstream, where available, or deploy VDSL2 with uncertain returns, 
given the higher investments required compared to the LLU. However, the 
JPMorgan report calls for new choices from LLU operators. In fact, it shows 
that there is a FTTH business case for alternative operators in Europe's 
metropolitan markets, as shown by Iliad in France and NetCologne in 
Germany. In these cases, where alternative operators have sufficient market 
share and access to infrastructure (ducts from the municipalities), payback 
of six years or less can be justified without assuming market share or ARPU 
gains. We mentioned before that infrastructure costs play a significant role in 
explaining the cost differences between the various access network 
architectures. The JPMorgan report estimates that assuming a reduction of 
50% duct and building related costs would lower the per customer 
connected cost from Euro 2,500 to Euro 1,500. Therefore, the payback for a 
25% market share operator (without additional ARPU or market share 
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increase) would drop from 16 years to 10 years. At 40% market share, the 
Net Cologne case, the payback would be reduced to 6 years.  
The importance of sharing infrastructure is also supported by ARCEP 
(2006) in the FTTH case study for the City of Clermont-Ferrand, where 
access to a network of ducts covering the whole city brings the coverage by 
a private operator from 1% to 21% of the area, and from 1% to 79% of all 
households 2. It is also worth mentioning that in countries like Japan, USA 
and some rural areas of France, fiber to building or home is based on aerial 
deployment and does not need trenching and ducting, with a substantial 
reduction of  capital expenditures. Furthermore, a recent study by WIK 
Consult (2007), shows that in a FTTH greenfield business case, assuming a 
scenario where a 25% market share operator would be able to avoid 50% of 
the infrastructure costs due to access to ducts and would be able to increase 
its retail market share to 30%, there would be a positive business case with 
an NPV of Euro +500 per customer. This is quite a realistic assumption in 
many major European cities.  
These studies show that the availability, in specific geographic areas, of 
existing infrastructures such as ducts or fiber can make even the most costly 
fiber access network solutions viable and call for a much more flexible 
approach from regulators. This is based on the understanding of the different 
available technology solutions, the existing level of infrastructure competition 
especially in metropolitan areas, and the diverse geographic market 
conditions in order to limit the potential regulatory intervention only to 
enduring economic bottlenecks 3. 
To complete our review of solutions for NGAN players, it is worth 
mentioning that Analysys Insight (2006), in an ad hoc report for OPTA, 
emphasizes that subloop unbundling for VDSL solutions to around 1000 of 
the largest street cabinets in the dense urban areas in the Netherlands may 
be economically viable for an alternative provider with a 10% market share 
under some specific circumstances related to SLU tariffs and reasonable 
expected ARPU increase.  
                     
2 ARCEP just launched a consultation on the evaluation of competitive access to ducts. 
http://www.arcep.fr/uploads/tx_gspublication/consult-ftth-fourreaux-juillet07.pdf 
3 Ofcom in its Strategic Review of Telecommunications defines an "enduring economic 
bottleneck" as the part of a network where the economics of alternative offerings are such that 
competition, through further market entry or innovation, is very unlikely to emerge in the relevant 
time horizon. 
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NGAN in Italy: where geography matters 
Telecom Italia (TI), on March 9th 2007, announced, in a meeting with the 
financial community, its plans for network evolution. TI Next Generation 
Access Network project aims at fully migrating the current network to a 
broadband network which allows for more than 50 Mbit/s on fixed 
infrastructure and 10 Mbit/s on a mobile one. Furthermore, TI would like to 
massively introduce Fiber (FTTx) in the access network and to install VDSL2 
technology (up to 65% of population coverage) and to implement a "Full IP" 
network. Total project capex is around 6.5 Bln €. About 65% of the lines will 
be covered by the new network with broadband downloading capacity up to 
100Mbit/s, provided by a mix of technologies, including FTTCab and FTTB 
solutions (especially in main cities). The remaining 35% will be served by 
FTTE solutions. To understand the economics and regulatory implications of 
this process it is interesting to look at the deployment of Telecom Italia's 
NGAN in Milano. 
On May 30th 2007 Telecom Italia signed an agreement with Metroweb 
(MW) to use MW fiber to deploy a TI next generation access network in 
Milano. Milano is one of the richest and quite densely populated areas in 
Italy. Metroweb is the owner of the widest distributed fiber optical network in 
the strategic areas of Milano and Valtellina. Metroweb operates as an 
independent open network access provider that offers its infrastructure to 
third parties which are providers of telecommunication services 4.   
During this 15 year agreement (renewable for a further 15 years), TI will 
be able to reach 70,000 buildings in Milano with FTTB solutions. Metroweb's 
fiber will be used by TI only in the secondary access network, from the 
optical splitter of TI to the ONU in the building or nearby, while it will use its 
own fiber in the primary access network.  Metroweb is acting as a wholesale 
open access network provider and is already offering fiber to Fastweb, the 
first operator to offer an all IP fiber network in Italy (from 1999) and the major 
broadband competitor to TI in Milano 5. 
                     
4 On the sustainability of these open access models, see BANERJEE & SIRBU (2006). To find 
out more about Metroweb see : http://www.metroweb.it/index.php 
5 Until June 2003, Fastweb directly owned 23% of Metroweb and after that date sold its shares 
to AEM. As of April 2007 Fasweb's network - 23,500 km – covered 45% of the Italian 
population, 10 m homes passed and 850 Local switches with LLU. It has invested 4 b euros 
since 1999, and has 1.062.400 customers. See FASTWEB (2007) for further information. 
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In Milano there are currently 16 alternative telecom operators that offer 
services to business customers with their own fiber infrastructure. In 
addition, there are 4 alternative operators in the residential market and 8 
alternative operators in the business market using LLU to compete with TI.  
When looking at the residential broadband retail market, TI estimates that 
its market share in Milano is well below the 50% figure frequently used by 
the Italian National Regulatory Agency (AGCOM) to claim the dominance of 
TI in the retail broadband market (AGCOM, 2007, p. 22). Furthermore, this 
share has declined over time. 
Milano's competitive scenario, where full facilities-based competition 
already exists, sets the development of Next Generation Access Network in 
a totally different situation compared to the first round of market reviews and 
calls for the identification of relevant market on a geographic basis to limit 
regulatory intervention only to existing enduring bottlenecks 6. 
Is Milano an isolated case in the Italian competitive landscape? Milano 
definitely has some unique characteristics such as the extensive presence of 
the Metroweb fiber network, but in quite a few metropolitan and middle-sized 
Italian cities many operators already compete vigorously with TI, mainly by 
using LLU. 
Furthermore, besides Milano, TI is well below the 50% market share of 
the residential retail broadband market also in Genova and Roma. In fact, 
Fastweb already has 2 m homes passed with its own fiber network. 
Moreover, many utilities and municipalities, such as ENI, ENEL, ASM, 
ITALGAS, from Milano in Northern Italy to Palermo in Southern Italy, own 
infrastructures (ducts and fibers) that can be used to build next generation 
access networks as TI is doing in Milano, using MW facilities.  
Finally, we need to mention the presence of the legacy infrastructure 
from the Telecom Italia's Socrates Project, conceived in the middle 90's with 
hybrid technology HFC (fiber + coax), to bring pay TV and multimedia 
services to Italian households. Although this project was stopped after TI's 
privatization in 1999, it left TI's network with an "endowment" of fiber and 
ducts for 1.6 m homes passed in 57 major Italian cities. Actually, these ducts 
were opened to competition by an Antitrust Proceeding in 2001, paving the 
                     
6 Although the Italian National Regulatory Agency (AGCOM) has so far defined national 
markets, it has imposed some geographic differentiation of regulatory remedies. Specifically, it 
has imposed WLR regulation only in areas where access seekers are still not using LLU. 
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way for e.Biscom (which merged with Fastweb in 2004) to sign an 
agreement to use TI's free duct capacity 7.  
The Socrates network will play an important role in the definition of the 
mix of FTTCab/FTTB solution for the deployment of Telecom Italia next 
generation access network, but it is also available to other telecom operators 
for NGAN investment projects.  
  Regulatory policies for NGAN 
In the previous section, we stressed that NGAN represent a significant 
technological evolution that may allow a spur of infrastructure-based 
competition at least in selected metropolitan areas. In this section we first 
discuss the main regulatory models proposed for the transition to NGAN, 
and then focus on what we consider to be the key issue from a regulatory 
point of view: the achievement of proper market definitions to take the 
emergence of NGAN correctly into account. 
Regulatory models for the transition to NGAN 
The transition to NGAN raises a number of very complex regulatory 
issues. It is in fact the first time that a dramatic change in fixed access 
technologies occurs in a large number of industrialised countries. Given the 
likely implications for investments, innovation and competition, it is no 
surprise that such a technological transition is now at the core of the 
regulatory debate. 
The main regulatory models proposed so far to address NGAN follow:  
• Extension of current wholesale regulation: was basically proposed by 
ERG (2007). It focuses on an appropriate extension of current wholesale 
regulatory tools in markets 4 (wholesale network infrastructure access) 
                     
7 On January 23, 2001 AGCM, the Competition authority, approved a concentration whereby 
Seat Pagine Gialle (Telecom Italia) acquired control of Cecchi Gori Communications, subject to 
some conditions. One of these was that TI should, from March 1st 2001, provide access to duct 
so that alternative operators could place their fiber optic lines "for the provision of interactive 
and multimedia services" in TI's existing duct infrastructure. The access had to be provided at 
non-discriminatory terms and cost oriented prices. See AGCM (2001). 
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and 5 (wholesale broadband access) in order to address the new 
bottlenecks brought about by NGAN. 
• Regulatory forbearance: it foresees no regulatory measures on 
NGAN. It is essentially the regulatory model advocated by the USA and 
Hong Kong. 
• Temporary forbearance (regulatory holidays): this model, initially 
proposed for Germany, foresees no regulation of so-called emerging 
markets for a certain period of time. It is therefore a "wait and see" 
regulatory model. 
We believe that a mere extension of the existing obligations on the 
incumbent operator for new technologies is not the correct regulatory answer 
to the roll out of NGAN since, as has also been suggested by ERG, existing 
tools must be adapted to the NGAN environment. Simply replicating ULL 
and wholesale bit-stream access remedies for NGAN would in fact risk 
hindering or impeding new investments and innovation.  
However, we also believe that both the "Regulatory forbearance" and the 
"Temporary forbearance" models can be satisfactory for a given 
country/region but, at the same time, completely inappropriate for another.  
In fact, the above regulatory models have a common relevant flaw: they 
continue to advocate national patterns of regulation whilst, in our opinion, the 
novelty of NGAN calls for a radical shift of regulation on a geographic level in 
order to take into account the large differences in terms of competing 
networks and infrastructures that can be found in any given country. 
In particular, we advocate a "geographic based regulation of enduring 
economic bottlenecks": the regulatory approach towards NGAN should limit 
ex ante access regulation to those enduring economic bottlenecks found at 
the level of specific geographic markets. This general principle needs to be 
accommodated first of all by means of appropriate market definitions in order 
to avoid unnecessary regulation.  
The definition of geographic markets  
in the European New Regulatory Framework 
It is a well known factor that the European Regulatory Framework (ERF) 
is based on technological neutrality and aims at the regulation of services 
and products regardless of the technology of the network used to deliver 
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them. This means that any regulatory measure must take the service in 
question - and not the network or the technology with which the service is 
provided - into account. 
In regulating the service markets the ERF indicates three basic steps: 
• The definition of relevant markets suitable to national circumstances 
(market definition). 
• An analysis of the relevant market in order to establish whether a 
given market is effectively competitive and to identify any undertakings with 
significant market power (SMP operators) on that market (assessment of 
significant market power). 
• The imposition of the appropriate ex-ante remedies to correct/avoid 
possible market failures due to dominant positions. 
We contend that in order to decide whether or not to regulate a given 
service provided over an NGAN, the first step – market definition – is the 
most important one. In fact, it is basically at this stage that the regulatory 
approach towards NGAN services will be largely shaped.  
As is common knowledge, a proper market definition procedure should 
consider two dimensions: 
- a product dimension, and 
- a geographic dimension in which the product is offered at similar 
conditions. 
We will address this second methodological step since it is an area which 
has essentially not been addressed by regulators. We start by reviewing the 
approach taken by the ERF as regards the definition of geographic markets. 
The large number of market analyses completed so far by NRAs show that 
European regulators have almost invariably identified national markets. 
Indeed, NRAs have been very reluctant to identify specific geographic 
markets on the grounds of the 18 markets identified in the European 
Commission (EC) Recommendation on Relevant Markets (2003). 
The definition of geographic markets by NRAs is however a duty clearly 
foreseen by the Framework Directive (2002), whereas article 15, 
paragraph 3 establishes that: 
"National regulatory authorities shall […] define relevant markets 
appropriate to national circumstances, in particular relevant geographic 
markets within their territory, in accordance with the principle of 
competition law".  
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Furthermore, Recital 27 of the Framework Directive, establishes that: 
"National regulatory authorities should analyze whether a given 
product or service market is effectively competitive in a given 
geographical area, which could be the whole or a part of the territory of 
the Member State." 
Accordingly, the Framework Directive, which has been transposed in 
every EU Member State, has given clear-cut powers to NRAs, as well as 
duties, regarding the definition of geographic markets.  
In particular, the methodology to be used by NRAs to define the 
geographic scope of the markets identified in the EC Recommendation has 
been addressed by the EC Guidelines on Market Analysis and the 
Assessment of Significant Market Power (2002). 
Firstly, the EC Guidelines point out that the definition of the geographic 
dimension of a given market is a methodological step which follows the 
definition of the product market: it is only after a given market has been 
defined in terms of products/services that the existence of a geographic 
dimension for such a market can be investigated by regulators. 
Secondly, the EC Guidelines establish the following general definition of 
a geographic market:  
"The relevant geographic market comprises an area in which the 
undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and demand of the 
relevant products or services, in which area the conditions of 
competition are similar or sufficiently homogeneous and which can be 
distinguished from neighbouring areas in which the prevailing 
conditions of competition are appreciably different". (EC, 2002) 
It is interesting to note that such a definition is basically the same one 
adopted by the EC in its "Notice on the definition of relevant market for the 
purposes of Community competition law" (1997). It follows that the definition 
of geographic markets for regulatory purposes adopted by the Commission 
is fully consistent with competition law principles. 
The above definition of a geographic market entails that in order to state 
that a given product market is characterised by a geographic dimension, it is 
not required that the conditions of competition in a given geographical area 
should be perfectly homogeneous; a finding of similar or sufficiently 
homogeneous conditions of competition is sufficient. 
G.B. AMENDOLA & L.M. PUPILLO 99 
CAVE, STUMPF & VALLETTI (2006) point out, however, that the 
interpretation of homogeneity of conditions of competition is not 
straightforward and deserves a careful scrutiny. As regards the demand 
side, they note that "the number and concentration of buyers might differ 
from region to region, although consumers' preferences may be fairly 
homogeneous (absent substantial income differentials)". (CAVE, STUMPF & 
VALLETTI, 2006, p. 29). Indeed, there usually is a larger concentration of 
buyers, mostly business buyers, in metropolitan areas. In addition, per capita 
income can also significantly diverge between metropolitan areas and less 
developed urban and rural areas. Therefore, demand side conditions could 
significantly diverge between different regions.  
As regards the supply side, CAVE, STUMPF & VALLETTI point to the 
very important role played by networks' availability on a local level. They 
stress that whereas mobile networks tend to be available nationwide, fixed 
networks are mostly deployed in heavily populated areas. As a result, supply 
side conditions in fixed telecommunications markets can significantly diverge 
on a local level. 
However, we must recognize that in defining the geographic dimension, 
geographic demand-side substitution does not appear to be an effective 
criterion. In fact, given that the cost associated with moving location is 
usually very high, it follows that it is very unlikely that downstream customers 
would move to an alternative area in response to a SSNIP (Small but 
Significant Non-Transitory Increase in Price) in their living area. The same is 
true on the supply side, due to the high cost and long time associated with 
deploying new network infrastructure as a response to a SSNIP in a given 
area. It hence follows that, in assessing the geographic scope of a market on 
the basis of homogeneity of competitive conditions, it is essential to 
concentrate on appropriate narrow areas - ad hoc geographic units - and 
focus on specific factors enabling similar conditions of competition (Ofcom, 
2006, pp. 37-41). We will return to this critical issue by proposing a possible 
geographic segmentation of markets 4 and 5. 
In addition, it is also important to take the possibility of a geographic 
differentiation of remedies within a larger geographic market into account. 
Such a regulatory approach has been endorsed by the EC in the new 
Recommendation on Relevant Markets (2007). The Commission states that 
it can be both valid to identify geographic markets and to differentiate 
remedies geographically within a larger market if the nature or degree of 
market failure differs on a geographical level.  
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Along the same lines, ERG (2006) maintains that geographical variations 
in remedies may be justified even if markets are national in character due to 
common pricing constraints. ERG contends that, notwithstanding the 
presence of common pricing constraints, demand and supply conditions may 
be very different on a local level. Therefore, long-term prospects for 
infrastructure competition may significantly differ within a national market. In 
such circumstances, ERG concludes that a geographic differentiation of 
remedies can be fully justified.  
Clearly, there are remarkable regulatory differences between a proper 
identification of a geographic relevant market and the variation in remedies 
in a given area. Amongst other factors, the former may even allow a finding 
of non-SMP in a given geographic area, which in turn would justify the 
removal (as well as the lack of imposition) of any remedy in a given territory, 
whilst a mere differentiation of remedies may not necessarily imply such a 
radical shift in regulation. 
Geographic market definition in an NGAN framework 
We can now address what we consider to be the core issue in 
establishing a fair regulatory policy to tackle the competition problems raised 
by the emergence of NGAN: the definition of appropriate geographic 
markets in the specific case of services provided over NGAN. 
A correct completion of the first step of market definition – the product 
dimension – is, in fact, not enough. If relevant markets remain national in 
scope, whilst they should be defined on a local level, it follows that 
obligations would be imposed on a national level (with the significant 
exception, as we have underlined, of a possible geographic differentiation for 
some wholesale services). In this case they could be, at best, suitable for 
some local areas but, at the same time, completely unsuitable for others, 
thus creating artificial regulatory barriers – in these areas – to the 
development of an effective competition in the provision of services based 
on the new FTTH, FTTB and FTTC architectures. 
In order to deliver correct market signals to investors and innovators, 
regulators should therefore concentrate on proper definitions of wholesale 
markets on a local level. For this purpose, it is of key importance to find a 
new geographic definition of markets 4 and 5, as the pillars of the regulatory 
intervention currently ensure, respectively, an infrastructure-based 
competition by means of local loop unbundling, and a "light" model of 
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competition (very often a simple resale model) based on the provision of bit-
stream access products. 
First of all, we must define the appropriate geographic unit for a possible 
geographic segmentation of markets 4 and 5. A number of different 
geographic unit options can be considered. As Ofcom (2007) puts it, the 
trade-off between granularity and practicality should be carefully assessed. 
In particular, Ofcom (2007) contends that the use of local exchange as the 
reference geographic unit strikes a reasonable balance in the trade-off 
between granularity and practicality. This approach is also strongly 
consistent with the current competitive landscape. In fact, LLU is provided at 
the local exchange level. Accordingly, variations in competitive conditions 
can be fairly observed exactly at the local exchange level. The FCC also 
adjusts remedies based on the number of competitive operators collocated 
at the central office (MAXWELL, SIERADZKI & WOOD, 2007, p. 182). 
Individual exchanges can then be grouped by taking into account the 
different factors affecting the degree of competition on a local level. It follows 
that local exchanges marked by similar competitive conditions should be 
grouped together and then addressed by means of the same regulatory 
tools.  
We argue that the above methodological approach should be 
implemented in the cases of both markets 4 and 5. 
As regards market 4, it is likely that this market is still, as we write, 
national in scope in every European country. Nonetheless, market analysis 
should focus - on a local exchange level - on a number of factors that could 
deeply affect the evolution of access obligations imposed in market 4. In 
fact,  the lack of any asymmetrical obligation in market 4 regarding the new 
networks (or at least a strong limitation of this type of regulation) would be 
fully justified, in a grouping of local exchange areas marked by one of the 
following conditions: presence of inter-platform competition; availability of a 
fibre open access network, such as the Metroweb network in Milano; 
availability of a legacy infrastructure which is de facto already open to third 
parties access due to the existence of antitrust undertakings (the case of 
Telecom Italia's Socrates Network); and, finally, availability of either utilities' 
or municipalities' networks that could be exploited for the deployment of 
NGAN. 
Commercial agreements between operators (like the Milano example 
clearly shows) and, in addition, existing antitrust rules in countries such as 
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Italy, can indeed be sufficient in some local areas to ensure that potential 
investors develop, in a competitive setting, their NGANs according to their 
business plans. We must also underline that should commercial agreements 
be deemed as not fully satisfactory by regulators, NRAs might nonetheless 
introduce symmetrical regulation aimed at eliminating possible barriers either 
impeding or delaying the competitive roll out of NGAN 8. 
Summing up, in this type of local areas, the transition from LLU to either 
a FTTCab or a FTTH/FTTB architecture could be for OLOs economically 
sustainable, provided that civil engineering costs, that represent the most 
relevant cost factor in the roll out of NGAN, are substantially reduced by 
means of access to existing ducts, suitable for fibre deployment, which can 
be owned by a number of different operators or municipalities. Accordingly, a 
geographical differentiation of remedies in market 4 with regard to NGAN 
access obligations might be fully justified. 
As regards market 5, the grouping of local exchanges should be based 
on the level of LLU-based competition. The degree of competition in the 
wholesale broadband access market is in fact largely the result of LLU-
based competition in markets downstream from wholesale local access. This 
is basically the approach adopted by Ofcom (2007). We share this 
methodological approach but we point out that the grouping methodology 
adopted by Ofcom could be adapted to the specific national circumstances.  
Summing up, in local exchange areas marked by vigorous LLU 
competition, the lack of any SMP finding in market 5 appears fully justified. 
Hence, the removal of existing remedies in market 5 imposed by means of 
previous nation-wide proceedings as well as the lack of any new 
asymmetrical obligations regarding the new network would be clearly 
justified. 
                     
8 This case could be the inside wiring one, where the best option is to encourage market forces 
to identify, and strike, the right balance. In fact, infrastructure sharing can be the result of freely 
negotiated agreements rather than the result of a regulatory intervention. However, in the event 
of market failures, the second best option is to address the in-house wiring by means of 
symmetrical regulation. In other words, each operator which owned in-house wiring should offer 
access to it. 
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  Conclusions 
Regulatory governance of Next Generation Access Networks in Europe 
cannot follow the "One size regulation fits all" approach. In fact, although we 
do not think that fiber in Europe will follow the US example - the forbearance 
model - we strongly believe that regulation will need to be made more 
flexible. If promoting facilities-based competition is the goal, then it may best 
to geographically differentiate the regulatory access regime based on the 
varying underlying cost conditions of entry and presence of alternative 
platforms.  
Our review of some European studies on NGAN in Europe and our 
specific focus on the Italian situation, in particular on the competitive 
situation in Milano, has shown the relevant flaw of continuing to advocate 
national patterns of regulation while the deployment of NGAN calls for a 
radical shift of regulation on a geographic level.  
The recognition that an NGAN business case does exist for OLO in a 
number of local areas, mainly metropolitan ones, has relevant regulatory 
implications. 
First of all, as competition conditions differ significantly in local areas, we 
claim that regulation should promote both incumbents' and OLO's 
investments in NGAN by limiting ex-ante interventions to those enduring 
economic bottlenecks found on a level of specific geographic markets.  
Secondly, market definition is the most important step in the market 
analysis procedure in order to decide whether or not to regulate a given 
service provided over an NGAN. We have proposed a taxonomy of local 
areas that may be adopted in a country like Italy for a correct geographic 
definition of markets 4 and 5 and, as a consequence, for the imposition of 
appropriate remedies. The adoption of a regulatory forbearance model in 
local areas like Milano is fully justified. 
The analysis here presented shows the importance of shifting regulation 
on a geographic level. This provides a further justification for prospective 
analyses aimed at reducing costs driven by inappropriate regulation. 
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